Audit Log

Rafter writes a security audit log to ~/.rafter/audit.jsonl in JSONL format (newline-delimited JSON). Every security-relevant action—command interceptions, secret detections, policy overrides—is recorded as a single JSON object per line. Both the Node and Python CLIs write to the same file using the same schema. The Node CLI is the reference implementation; the Python CLI currently emits command_intercepted and secret_detected events only.

File Location

~/.rafter/audit.jsonl

The directory ~/.rafter/ is created automatically on first use.

Schema

Every audit log entry contains these fields:

Base Fields

Field	Type	Required	Description
`timestamp`	string	yes	ISO 8601 UTC timestamp (e.g., `2026-02-20T10:30:45.123Z`)
`sessionId`	string	yes	Unique per CLI invocation. Format: `{epoch_ms}-{random}`
`eventType`	string	yes	Event type identifier (see Event Types)
`agentType`	string	no	AI agent platform: `"openclaw"` or `"claude-code"`

`action` Object

Present on most events. Contains context about what triggered the event.

Field	Type	Required	Description
`command`	string	no	Shell command string
`tool`	string	no	Tool name (e.g., `Write`, `Bash`)
`riskLevel`	string	no	`"low"`, `"medium"`, `"high"`, or `"critical"`

`securityCheck` Object

Always present. Records the outcome of the security evaluation.

Field	Type	Required	Description
`passed`	boolean	yes	Whether the security check passed
`reason`	string	no	Human-readable explanation
`details`	object	no	Structured metadata (event-specific)

`resolution` Object

Always present. Records what action was taken.

Field	Type	Required	Description
`actionTaken`	string	yes	`"blocked"`, `"allowed"`, `"overridden"`, or `"redacted"`
`overrideReason`	string	no	User-provided justification (only on `policy_override`)

Event Types

`command_intercepted`

Emitted when a shell command is evaluated against the security policy.

Field	Value
`action.command`	The shell command string
`action.riskLevel`	Dynamically assessed: `low`, `medium`, `high`, or `critical`
`securityCheck.passed`	`true` if allowed, `false` if blocked
`securityCheck.reason`	Why the command was blocked/flagged
`resolution.actionTaken`	`"allowed"`, `"blocked"`, or `"overridden"`

Example:

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-20T10:30:45.123Z",
  "sessionId": "1740047445123-k8f2m",
  "eventType": "command_intercepted",
  "agentType": "claude-code",
  "action": {
    "command": "git push --force",
    "riskLevel": "high"
  },
  "securityCheck": {
    "passed": false,
    "reason": "High-risk command requires approval"
  },
  "resolution": {
    "actionTaken": "blocked"
  }
}

`secret_detected`

Emitted when a secret is found in files, staged content, or tool output.

Field	Value
`action.riskLevel`	Always `"critical"`
`securityCheck.passed`	Always `false`
`securityCheck.reason`	`"{secret_type} detected in {location}"`
`resolution.actionTaken`	`"blocked"` or `"allowed"`

The audit log never contains the raw secret value—only the type (e.g., “AWS Access Key”) and location (e.g., “staged files”, “config.js”). Example:

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-20T10:25:12.456Z",
  "sessionId": "1740047445123-k8f2m",
  "eventType": "secret_detected",
  "agentType": "openclaw",
  "action": {
    "riskLevel": "critical"
  },
  "securityCheck": {
    "passed": false,
    "reason": "AWS Access Key detected in config.js"
  },
  "resolution": {
    "actionTaken": "blocked"
  }
}

`content_sanitized`

Emitted when sensitive patterns are redacted from output.

Field	Value
`securityCheck.passed`	Always `false`
`securityCheck.reason`	`"{n} sensitive patterns detected"`
`securityCheck.details`	`{ "contentType": "...", "patternsMatched": n }`
`resolution.actionTaken`	Always `"redacted"`

Example:

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-20T11:00:00.000Z",
  "sessionId": "1740047445123-k8f2m",
  "eventType": "content_sanitized",
  "securityCheck": {
    "passed": false,
    "reason": "3 sensitive patterns detected",
    "details": {
      "contentType": "shell_output",
      "patternsMatched": 3
    }
  },
  "resolution": {
    "actionTaken": "redacted"
  }
}

`policy_override`

Emitted when a user explicitly overrides a security policy (e.g., --force flag).

Field	Value
`action.command`	The overridden command (optional)
`action.riskLevel`	Always `"high"`
`securityCheck.passed`	Always `false`
`securityCheck.reason`	`"Security policy overridden by user"`
`resolution.actionTaken`	Always `"overridden"`
`resolution.overrideReason`	User-provided reason string

`scan_executed`

Reserved for future use. Will be emitted when file scans are performed.

`config_changed`

Reserved for future use. Will be emitted when security configuration is modified.

Redaction Behavior

The audit log is designed to be safe to retain and share:

Secret values are never logged. secret_detected events record the secret type and file location, not the secret itself.
Content is not stored. content_sanitized events record pattern counts and content types, not the raw content.
Commands are logged verbatim. command_intercepted events include the full command string. If commands contain sensitive arguments, they appear in the log.

Size and Rotation

No automatic rotation. The log file grows unbounded until cleanup runs.
Time-based retention: Entries older than retentionDays are purged when cleanup() is called.
No automatic scheduling. Cleanup must be triggered manually or via the API.
Default retention: 30 days.

Configuration

Configure audit logging in ~/.rafter/config.json under agent.audit, or in .rafter.yml under audit:

Key	Type	Default	Description
`logAllActions`	boolean	`true`	Master switch. If `false`, no events are written.
`retentionDays`	number	`30`	Days to retain entries before cleanup purges them.
`logLevel`	string	`"info"`	Stored in config but not currently used for filtering.

Config file example:

{
  "agent": {
    "audit": {
      "logAllActions": true,
      "retentionDays": 90,
      "logLevel": "info"
    }
  }
}

Policy file example (.rafter.yml):

audit:
  retention_days: 90
  log_level: info

Querying the Audit Log

Use rafter agent audit to view and filter entries:

# Show last 10 entries (default)
rafter agent audit

# Show last 50 entries
rafter agent audit --last 50

# Filter by event type
rafter agent audit --event secret_detected

# Filter by agent
rafter agent audit --agent claude-code

# Entries since a specific date
rafter agent audit --since 2026-02-01

# Combine filters
rafter agent audit --event command_intercepted --agent openclaw --last 100

Or query the JSONL file directly with standard tools:

# Count blocked commands
grep '"actionTaken":"blocked"' ~/.rafter/audit.jsonl | wc -l

# Find all secret detections with jq
jq 'select(.eventType == "secret_detected")' ~/.rafter/audit.jsonl

# Events from the last 24 hours
jq --arg cutoff "$(date -u -v-1d +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S)" \
  'select(.timestamp > $cutoff)' ~/.rafter/audit.jsonl

MCP Access

The read_audit_log MCP tool exposes audit log entries to MCP clients:

{
  "tool": "read_audit_log",
  "arguments": {
    "event_type": "secret_detected",
    "limit": 20
  }
}

See MCP Integration for setup.

Get Started

CLI Guides

Agent Security

References

Audit Log

Audit Log

File Location

Schema

Base Fields

`action` Object

`securityCheck` Object

`resolution` Object

Event Types

`command_intercepted`

`secret_detected`

`content_sanitized`

`policy_override`

`scan_executed`

`config_changed`

Redaction Behavior

Size and Rotation

Configuration

Querying the Audit Log

MCP Access

Get Started

CLI Guides

Agent Security

References

​Audit Log

​File Location

​Schema

​Base Fields

​action Object

​securityCheck Object

​resolution Object

​Event Types

​command_intercepted

​secret_detected

​content_sanitized

​policy_override

​scan_executed

​config_changed

​Redaction Behavior

​Size and Rotation

​Configuration

​Querying the Audit Log

​MCP Access

Audit Log

File Location

Schema

Base Fields

`action` Object

`securityCheck` Object

`resolution` Object

Event Types

`command_intercepted`

`secret_detected`

`content_sanitized`

`policy_override`

`scan_executed`

`config_changed`

Redaction Behavior

Size and Rotation

Configuration

Querying the Audit Log

MCP Access